ABSTRACT The surprise outcome of the 2016 presidential election continues to raise more questions as experts grapple with the evidence for why most prognosticators considered a Hillary Clinton victory almost certain. This article uses the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study data to show that a primary explanation for why the election of Donald Trump was difficult to predict is that the bulk of his support did not materialize until Election Day, in the battleground states that he had to carry to win the Electoral College.
M uch can be inferred from a few data points. The neighboring states of Florida and Georgia both allow early in-person (EIP), no-excuse absentee vote-by-mail (VBM), and Election Day (ED) voting. Florida was again the most coveted presidential battleground in 2016, 1 whereas Georgia was treated as a "blackout" state (Gimpel, Kaufmann, and PearsonMerkowitz 2007) , despite exhibiting single-digit vote margins since 2008. Before Election Day, Trump was down 246,798 votes in the Sunshine State, based on the sum of EIP and VBM ballots cast (ignoring the much smaller number of provisional ballots). However, on Election Day in Florida, Trump crushed his Democratic rival, taking 56.5% of ED votes-turning an almost quarter-million-vote deficit into a 114,033-vote surplus in the must-win state (Smith, McKee, and Hood 2017-2018, 125) . Although the Peach State did not have the same electoral drama that enveloped its southern neighbor, a similar pattern prevailed, as Trump performed better among ED voters (53.4%) than among EIP voters (52.3%) or VBM voters (51.1%).
The dynamic in Florida and Georgia prompted us to consider the national pattern of voting behavior in the 2016 presidential election with Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) data. Since the remarkably surprising outcome of the 2016 election, political prognosticators have entertained several explanations for why the evidence leaned so heavily in favor of a Clinton victory (Cohn 2017 Throughout this study, we relied on CCES respondents' selfreports of their presidential vote choice and whether their method for casting a vote was EIP, VBM, or ED. Given the wording of CCES's question for vote method, it was clear that voters who reported voting EIP or VBM did so prior to November 8, 2016. This was critical for our analysis because our fundamental point is that ED voters throughout the nation-particularly in the battleground states that decided the outcome of the 2016 presidential election-were significantly more likely to support Trump vis-à-vis Early voters (i.e., CCES respondents who voted EIP or VBM). We adopted Politico's definition of presidential battleground states in 2016: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 2 These 11 swing states arguably comprise a consensus list, given candidate visits, resource allocation, and media "horserace" coverage of the election.
Our assessment of voting behavior is sequential. claimed to vote on Election Day (53.6%) but, of course, Trump is the latest in a small canon of presidents who assumed the office despite garnering a minority of the major-party popular vote. 
MULTIVARIATE MODELS AND RESULTS
The preliminary evidence in table 1 suggests that ED voters in the Battleground States were the reason that Trump won the presidency; however, to demonstrate the robustness of this finding, we used multivariate analysis. In the first three regressions, Election Day is the key variable of interest. In each model, the dummy variable is positively signed and highly significant: ED voters were much more likely to support Trump compared to Early voters. Furthermore, the size of the coefficient is largest in the Battleground States model. The last three models parse out Early voters by type (i.e., EIP and VBM). We found VBM voters to be significantly less likely to vote for Trump compared to ED voters. Only in the Battleground States model did we find EIP voters to be significantly less supportive of Trump (p<0.10) than ED voters, although the EIP coefficient was always of the expected negative sign. Regarding the controls-as expected-compared to Republicans, Democrats and Independents always reported being less likely to vote for Trump, and black and Latino voters were always more likely to vote for Clinton as compared to white respondents. Other respondents displayed similar behavior except in the Battleground States models where there was no statistical distinction between their preferences and those of their white counterparts.
To avoid the non-intuitive nature of interpreting limited dependent-variable coefficients from our probit models, figure 1 displays the probability of voting for Trump for ED versus Early (i.e., EIP and VBM) voters for the first three models in table 2, setting all of the remaining covariates at their observed values (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013) . Furthermore, each probability estimate is bracketed with 95% confidence intervals. The evidence that it was ED voters in the key swing states that turned the Electoral College in favor of Trump is unmistakable. First, in the All States model (labeled "All Voters" in the figure, which includes a Battleground States dummy), the probabilities overlap at the 95% confidence interval for ED and Early voters. Second, in the
Stated another way, Trump was losing before Election Day and would have lost if not for a shift in support among ED voters, especially from those residing in battleground states such as Florida, which provide EIP and VBM options.
Non-Battleground States model, the probability of voting for Trump is clearly greater for ED voters than Early voters, but Trump still netted less than half of the two-party vote irrespective of voting mode (also true in the probability estimates for All Voters). Finally, only in the Battleground States model did we find that the confidence interval spans 0.50. This is the case only among ED voters, who were significantly more likely to vote for Trump vis-à-vis Early voters (because the confidence intervals do not overlap). 5 
CONCLUSION
In the 1992 Democratic New Hampshire primary, Bill Clinton declared himself the "Comeback Kid" because his second-place finish in a crowded field was a vast improvement over his woeful performance in the Iowa Caucuses (Scala 2003) . A quartercentury later, his wife seemed almost a certainty to become the 45th president, but her opponent-the political upstart and insurgent amateur Republican, celebrity entertainer, real estate mogul, and erstwhile casino magnate, Donald Trump-became the most surprising "comeback kid" in American history. Trump pulled an "inside straight" on Election Day, as voters in battleground states shifted decisively in his favor. Indeed, the 2016 CCES data reveal a remarkable dynamic: in each of the seven swing states that Trump won, he lost the sum of the early vote (i.e., EIP plus VBM). In other words, if not for the marked turn toward Trump on November 8, 2016, in these states, there is no way he would have prevailed.
We leave it to others to dissect whether the "October Surprise" James Comey letter (Silver 2017) was a sufficient or only a contributing factor to the collapse of the Clinton campaign in the key states that she had to carry. These included the much vaunted "blue wall" trio of Midwestern states (Michigan, Pennsylvania, In the 1992 Democratic New Hampshire primary, Bill Clinton declared himself the "Comeback Kid" because his second-place finish in a crowded field was a vast improvement over his woeful performance in the Iowa Caucuses (Scala 2003 .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. ....
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and Wisconsin) that a Republican managed to scale for the first time since the 1980s. Furthermore, we are skeptical of the persuasive power of Russian propaganda, but we are certain that 2016 was a "change" election (McKee 2018, 24) . To this end, Hillary Clinton clearly did not represent something new and different, whereas Trump-the victor, for better or worse-epitomized a historically novel choice. What is palpable from our analysis, however, is that polling the 2016 presidential election proved perilous because the profile of voters in the swing states on Election Day was significantly more pro-Trump than the voters who participated before the last day. 6 In the pivotal states that would determine the Electoral College winner, past was not prologue in 2016. Many who showed up early-and especially those who mailed in their ballot (Meredith and Malhotra 2011)-were registering their preferences before a topsy-turvy campaign ended with short-term conditions breaking for Trump. Admittedly, there are many questions that remain unanswered with regard to why Trump became one of only a few presidents to take office as a popular-vote loser. Perhaps most obvious, given the thrust of our study, is a more in-depth look at who were those voters that broke late for Trump in the battleground states that he had to win versus those who stayed home or participated earlier in the election cycle. We are certain to have plenty of scholarly company in further assessing the 2016 presidential electorate. For now, this study is important for an initial examination of the prevailing dynamic of voter preferences in the latest presidential contest, when voting was a drawn-out process so that the early stages of the race did not necessarily reflect and represent the latter stages (Gronke 2012) . At least in the 2016 contest, this meant that Hillary Clinton-the all-but-certain winner-was rendered a shocking loser. 7 
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